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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

BEN ARNOVITZ,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No.

12491

JOHN LOUIS TELLA,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the plaintiff Ben Arnovitz
to i·ecover damages for injury to his person and property resulting from an automobile collision between
appellant and respondent in which respondent
counterclaimed for damages to his automobile.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
A Trial was held before the Honorable Joseph
G. Jeppson of the District Court of the Third
Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah. The Judge rendered Judgment
in favor of the defendant and against plaintiff
for no cause of action and in favor of defendant and
against plaintiff on the defendant's Counter-claim
in the sum of $500.00 damages together with interest
1

at the rate of six ( 6%) per cent per annum from
June 8, 1970, until date of entry of the Judgment
and thereafter at the rate of eight (8%) per cent
per annum until satisfied and costs of $18.10.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Judgment for
no cause of action on his claim and a reversal of the
Judgment in favor of respondent on respondent's
counter-claim and if the Court deems it just an order
remanding the action to the District Court for a new
trial to comply with the findings of this Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about the 8th day of June, 1970 at approximately 4 :00 P.M. in the afternoon the vehicle
of the respondent and counterclaimant was bmnped
from the rear by a vehicle owned and driven by the
appellant in an initial collision and the vehicle of the
respondent then backed into the vehicle of the appellant in a second collision, both collisions occurring
near the intersection of Second South and Second
East in Salt Lake City. Both vehicles were traveling
in an easterly direction.
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The appellant was proceeding in an easterly
direction along Second South in the City of Salt
Lake approaching its intersection with Second East.
Respondent was also driving an automobile in an
easterly direction along Second South traveling in
the same lane a short distance in front of appellant.
When the automobile in which respondent was riding
2

approached the intersection of Second South and Second East appellant's automobile bumped the respondent's automobile causing little or no damage to respondent's and appellant's cars and no injuries to
either driver. Respondent's car then backed into the
appellant's car causing a second collision much more
severe than the first in which both cars were severely
damaged. The appellant was taken by ambulance
to the Holy Cross Hospital and treated for lacerations in the nose requiring a total of 10 stitches,
bruises on the chest, abdomen, ribs, and knees, and
multiple lacerations and contusions on the nose and
right chest. Respondent was not injured.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO
ALLOW APPELLANT 'TO INTRODUCE INTO
EVIDENCE THE TESTIMONY OF EYE WITNESSES TO THE COLLISION THAT THE RESPONDENT APPEARED TO BE ANGRY AS
HE BACKED HIS CAR INTO THE APPELLANT'S CAR.

Appellant alleged in his complaint that the respondent "willfully, wantonly, and maliciously backed his car into the plaintiff's car with such force as
to cause the injuries to plaintiff hereinafter alleged."
Appellant contended that because of the provocation of the initial collision respondent became
angry and in the heat of that anger intentionally
backed his car into appellant's car causing injuries
to appellant out of which this law suit arose. Thus,
3

appellant's case turned on whether or not he could
establish respondent's intent.
In seeking to establish the respondent's intent
to back his automobile into appellant, the witnesses
were questioned as to any emotion exhibited by the
respondent as he was proceeding in reverse toward
appellant. (R. P. 11-12)
Q. When you first observed Mr. Tella
proceeding in reverse were you close enough
to observe his demeanor at all?
THE COURT: I don't know what you
mean, demeanor.
Q. (By Mr. Nielson) Could you see any
emotion exhibited by Mr. Tella?
A. Well, as I saidMR. MOFFITT: I object to that, Your
Honor, he can testify to what he actually observed, but emotion .isn't something that you
can see.
THE COURT: That's what he is asking
for, overruled.
MR. NIELSON: You may answer.
THE COURT: While the defendant was
going to reverse.
THE \VITNESS: He appeared angry.
MR. MOFFITT: I object to that, Your
Honor, that is a conclusion.
THE COURT: It's a conclusion, and it
is stricken. Will you state what you saw that
made you come to that conclusion? You may
testify to that.
4

Q. (By Mr. Nielson) How do you draw
the conclusion, Mr. Jensen, that Mr. Tella was
somehow angry?
MR. MOFFITT: I object to that again,
you are asking for a conclusion, in effect. He
can testify as to what he saw.
THE COURT: You may testify. Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Well, he acted as
though he wereTHE COURT: What did he do?
THE WITNESS: Well, as I said, he
looked over his shoulder, he watched where he
was driving. And he was driving rapidly and
smashed into Mr. Arnovitz's car. (R. P. 24)
Q. Mrs. Jensen, could you please tell us
what you observed about Mr. Tella that he
was somehow angry?
MR. MOFFIT: I object, it is leading.
THE COURT : Sustained. Stricken.
Q. (By Mr. Nielson) Was Mr. Tella
angry when he was backing?
MR. MOFFITT: Objection, that is asking for a conclusion. (R. P. 28-29)
Q. (By Mr. Nielson) I asked this question of your husband, Mrs. Jensen, I would
like to ask you as Mr. Tella's car was in reverse did you notice anything about his demeanor?
THE COURT: I don't know what you
mean by demeanor. Are you asking for facial
expression, or are you asking for the operation
of the car?
5

lViR. NIELSON: I'm asking for facts
concerning Mr. Tella's position in the car, and
which would indicate any emotion on his part.
THE COURT: When the defendant was
backing what did you observe about him?
THE WITNESS: Well, he looked-as
he was going back?
THE COURT: Yes. What did you see
about him as he was going back?
THE WITNESS: Well, that he was in
a hurry or backing fast, all I know is that he
was sureThe court disallowed the witnesses' testin1ony
as to the emotion exhibited on the grounds that they
were drawing a conclusion. This court in the past
has allowed testimony relating to exhibited emotions.
In Fritz v. Western Union Tel. Co. (1903) 25
Utah 263, 71 P. 209, a telegraph company was sued
for the death of one of its linemen while putting up a
wire. It appeared that the deceased lineman was
directed to take the place of another workman who
had received a shock from the telegraph wire while
pulling on it, and who stated that fact to deceased.
This workman was asked with regard to the appearance of deceased at the time he came to take his place,
as to whether deceased appeared to realize there was
any danger, - and answered that he appeared as
though there was no danger, and looked at the witness in a disgusted way, as much as to say that the
witness did not know anything about it.
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This court allowed the testimony stating that it
was not objectionable, in stating a conclusion:
"The statement as to the appearance of
another is a fact, and not a conclusion-"

lnln Re Miller's Estate (1909) 36 Utah 228, 102 P.
996, an action was brougq.t to revoke a Will on the
ground of undue influence. ~'itnesses' testimony
was admitted as to testator's "feelings" toward her
children; that the second wife "hated" them; that
"he was cowed down by her" and that at times she
was "bitter " "agitated" and in "a state of sunpressed excitement"; and that the testator "always
manifested the greatest affection for his children,"
and that his demeanor toward them was "affectionate."
'

'

J:

This Court has admitted testimony into evidence
on a b1·oad range of emotions including anger. The
lower Court erred in ref using to allow testimony of
eye witnesses relating to the emotion of anger exhibited by respondent as he was proceeding in reverse toward appellant's automobile.
In 69 A.L.R. 1168 the above facts are supported:
"It is generally held that a witness may
testify as to the emotions mainfested by another and observed by him. Evidence of the
existence or absence of the emotions of fear,
anger, joy, excitement, nervousness, earnestness, anxiety, disgust, curiosity, surprise, embarassment, sympathy, despondency, displeasure, satisfaction, and the like, has thus been
admitted. The competency of such testimony
7

is based on necessity. Since it is well-nigh impossible to describe another's appearance in
such manner as to convey to a jury an accurate picture of the emotion manifested by him
at a given time, the admission of such evidence
is not open to common objection to nontechnical opinion evidence, that the function of the
jury is being usurped. In answer to the contention that one may not testify as to the state
of mind or mention cognition of another, it is
frequently said that one's appearance under
stress of an emotion is a fact; and to say that
another, appeared to be excited at a given time
is not an opinion or conclusion, but is the
statement of a fact, within the common
knowledge of all persons of normal understanding.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE FINDING OF FACT, NUMBEE THREE OF THE COURT THAT THE
FORCE AND IMP ACT OF THE INITIAL
COLLISION PROPELLED DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE FORWARD WITH SUCH FORCE THAT
THE FRONT SEAT OF SAID VEHICLE WAS
TORN LOOSE FROM THE FLOOR OF SAID
VEHICLE, THE CARBURETOR LINKAGE
GOVERNING
THE
ACCELERATOR
OR
THROTTLE WAS BROKEN CAUSING THE
VEHICLE TO OPERATE UNCONTROLLABLY
IN "FULL ACCELERATION," AND THE
THE TRANSMISSION OF THE VEHICLE WAS
FORCED INTO REVERSE GEAR EITHER BY
THE IMPACT ITSELF OR BY THE DEFENDANT'S INVOLUNTARY ACTIONS AS A
DIRECT RESULT OF THE FORCE OF THE IMPACT, WHICH RESULTED IN THE SECOND
COLLISION AS A DIRECT AND PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF THE FIRST COLLISION AND
PLAINTIIFF'S NEGLIGENCE.

Witnesses testified that respondent was sitting
8

upright after the first collision, and had placed his
right arm over the front seat and was looking backward over his right shoulder as he proceeded in reverse.
(R. P. 8)

THE COURT: That is stricken. I asked
you to just testify to what you saw, not what
he had to do.
THE WITNESS: His car started backmg up.
THE COURT: Thank you.
THE WITNESS: He was watching
where he was backing. He was looking over
his shoulder. And he backed up a very rapid
speed, I would estimate he was pushing his
accelerator down.

(R. P. 37)

Q. Did you observe the collision after
Mr. Tella was backing up?
A. Yes. In my rear view mirror I
noticed him backing up and it seemed strange
to me so I watched in my rear view mirror.
Q. What do you mean it seemed strange?
A.Well, that the automobile was backing
up after it had been hit and knocked forward.
And Mr. Tella had his right arm over the back
of the front seat and he was looking over his
right shoulder as he was backing up.
Since the second collision was more severe than
the first the correct inference from the evidence
would be that the seat was torn loose during the second collision.
9

(R. P. 49)

Q. You testified you saw both collisions?
A. Yes.
Q. I would like to know, I would like
to have you make a comparison between the
severity of the two collisions.
MR. MOFFITT: I object, Your Honor.
I think he has got to tell us what he saw, but I
don't think he can make the conclusion.
THE COURT: Overruled.
THE WITNESS: I would say that the
second collision was about twice as severe as
the first one.
Q. Did you see any dents?
A. There were very small-I don't think
any headlights had been damaged at all, but
there was a few dents on the front of his car
where a bumper had hit.
As to the second collision the witness testified:

(R. P. 49-50)

Q. You testified you parked your car,
got out and then went to the scene of the collision?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you have a chance to observe
clearly and closely both cars at the scene of the
accident?
A. Fairly clear.
Q. vVould you describe for us the damage to Mr. Arnovitz's car first?
,.
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A. It was extensively damaged in the
front end. The grill and the headlight, I believe, had been damaged and broken out. The
front end had been pushed back to approximately one foot and that was about all.
Q. Did you notice anything, any damage to Mr. Tella's car?

A. Just where there was dents in the
trunk and the back where the light, you know,
sticks out from the body. And there was dents
on the fender.
No evidence was introduced that the initial collision caused the carburetor linkage governing the
accelerator or throttle to break causing the vehicle
engine to operate uncontrollably in "full acceleration."
(R. P. 93-94)

Q. Mr. Tella, have you ever had any
problem with your accelerator before?
A. No, Sir.
Q. Never before?
A. Never.
Q. Did you have a mechanic examme
it?
A. You don't examine anything until
something goes wrong with it.
Q. After this occurrence?
A. Yes, it was checked. It was broken
off. It was hit with such impact.
THE COURT: What was broken off?
11

THE WITNESS: The accelerator arm
to the carburetor.
Q. (By Mr. Nielson) Were you the one
that first noticed that?
A. I knew it when the car wouldn't turn
off, the engine racing wildly, that's when I
knew it was stuck.
Q. Did you ever have a competent mechanic examine the car after this accident?
A. No, sir.
It is impossible to conclude from the evidence
that the initial collision caused the damage to the carburetor linkage governing the accelerator. Since an
eye witness observed the two collisions and testified
that the second was at least twice as severe as the
first the logical conclusion would be that the damage
was done upon the second collision.
The lower court also had no basis for holding
that the transmission of respondent's vehicle was
forced into reverse gear by the impact of the initial
collision or by respondent's involuntary actions resulting from the force of the first impact.
The testimony of the eye witnesses to the collision indicated that very little or no damage appeared
on either car after the first collision. This would
indicate that the impact was very mild and certainly
not severe enough to force the transmission of the
respondent's vehicle into reverse or cause his arms to
flail in a manner which would force the gear into reverse.
12

(R. P. 18-19, 43, 44)

Q. But you didn't see an impact prior to
the time of the colliison that occurred when
the Tella vehicle went back?
A. Absolutely not. This is the first time
I saw them, they were thirty feet apart, or
more.
Q. At that point did you observe any
damage on either of the vehicles?
A. No, none.
Q. Was there any, or did you just not
observe it?
A. There was none-there had been no
contact.
Q. They had not?
A. Well, I had seen no contact.
Q. You said they had not, do you know
that they had not?
A. I can't swear to that.
Q. Can you swear there was no damage
on either vehicle at that time?
A. There was no observable.
Q. That you did in fact did observe?
A. I could have seen it if there had been
any severe damage.
THE COURT: Do you see any damage
on the defendant's automobile before it backed?
THE WITNESS: No.
THE COURT: Any on the other car?
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THE WITNESS: No, I didn't observe.
THE COURT: Or did you look and no
see any?
THE WITNESS: Well, I didn't look at
the back of the car when it was backinp up.

Q.

Did you see any dents?

A. There were very small-I don't think
any headlights had been damaged at all, but
there was a few dents on the front of his car
where a bumper had hit.
The testimony of the respondent indicated that
it was necessary to manipulate the gear shaft in
order to get it into reverse position.
(R. P. 92, 96)

Q. You heard the various witnesses
testify, Mr. Tella, that you backed into Mr.
Arnovitz's car. Could you tell us how your car
got into reverse position?
A. I don't know exactly how the car got
into reverse position. I know the first impact
was violent enough to break the seat loose,
throwing me backwards. Now, whether my
hand came down automatically on that and
threw it into reverse or whether the impact
on the mechanism did it itself, I don't know.
But the car did go into reverse and backed
into Mr. Arnovitz's car.
Q. (By Mr. Nielson) Now, Mr. Tella,
on most cars that I have driven to get it into
reverse you must position the gear shift lever
correctly or you cannot move it. Now, on your
car was it necessary for you to pull the gear
14

shift lever forward or backward in order to
get it into position?
A. I never tried to get it in position
without lifting up. Other than that I can't
answer that question.
Q. Normally you lift it up?
A. In the normal position.
The evidence does not justify a holding that the force
of the initial impact, which was much less severe than
the second, mysteriously forced respondent's transmission into reverse. No evidence was introduced
as to how thiR would be mechanically feasible.
Since the lever requires conscious manipulation
to be put into reverse as shown by the above testimony the court was not justified in holding that
respondent's involuntary actions resulting from the
initial impact forced the lever into reverse.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE FINDING OF FACT '.AND
CONCLUSION OF LAW OF THE COURT THAT
THE DEFENDANT WAS ENTIRELY FREE
FROM ANY NEGLIGENCE, MALICE, OR INTENT WHATSOEVER.

The testmony of eye witnesses relating to the
emotion of anger exhibited by respondent was improperly excluded by the lower court and would have
established malice.
POINT IV.
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION OF LAW NUMBER ONE OF THE COURT THAT THE NEGLIGENCE OF APPELLANT WAS THE SOLE
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PROXIMATE CAUSE OF A SECONDARY
COLLISION WHICH OCCURED BETWEEN
VEHICLES OWNED AND OPERERATED BY
THE APPELLANT AND THE RESPONDENT
ON OR ABOUT THE 8TH DAY OF JUNE, 1970,
APPROXIMATELY 60 FEET WEST OF THE
INTERSECTION OF SECOND SOUTH AND
SECOND EAST, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH.

The question as to how the respondent's vehicle
got into reverse gear is dispositive of this issue.
This question has been clarified above.
POINT V.
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE FINDING OF FACT 'AND
CONCLUSION OF LAW THAT THE VALUE OF
THE DEFENDANT'S VEHIICLE WAS $500.00.

Respondent's vehicle was never appraised as to
its value prior to the collision. Newspaper advertisements introduced into evidence showing prices of
similar cars are irrelevant as to the actual worth of
the respondent's automobile. Thus the holding that
the respondent vehicle was worth 500.00 prior to the
collision is unsupported by the evidence.
CONCLUSION
Since appellant's case depended upon establishing an intentional act on the part of the respondent
the Court's refusal to admit testimony as to respondent's emotion as he was proceeding in reverse toward
appellant's vehicle was extremely prejudicial to appellant and is grounds for reversal of the judgment
in the lower court. Utah law as to the admissibilty
of testimony regarding emotions is clear. The cases
16

hold that an observed emotion is a fact not a conclus10n.
The holding by the lower court that the initial
collision was responsible for the second collision is
unsupported by the evidence in the record. The only
plausible explanation as to how respondent initially
got into reverse is that he intentionally manipulated
the lever to the reverse position in a fit of anger
brought on by the provocation of the initial impact.
Respectfully submitted,
FRANCIS J. NIELSON
1309 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant
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